

# Energy Security Threats In The Mediterranean With Maritime Delimitation Disputes: Turkey vs “Cyprus”

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## Abstract

In this study, the maritime delimitation dispute between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot administration will be defined and analyzed in the context of offshore activities in the Mediterranean. The aim of this paper has been to get a better understanding of what has been occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean between both sides and how maritime zones are violated by Greek Cypriots. Latest events showed that Turkey will not give any permission to the foreign vessels seismic survey in its continental shelf area. Maritime zones are integrated part of the Cyprus problem. This issue should be a part of the comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. Equal sharing the Island's natural resources are necessary. Greek Cypriots have no right to act unilaterally. There is no single sovereign authority on the island. No one cannot disregard Turkish Cypriots and Turkey's maritime jurisdictions. The cooperation is so hard but so too are barriers. Furthermore, possible energy roads will be discussed. As result, Turkey seems to hold the key the Eastern Mediterranean's energy security in the near future.

Keywords: Energy, Exclusive Economic Zone, Maritime Jurisdictions, Mediterranean, Turkey, The Greek Cypriot Administration.

## 1. Introduction

The delimitation of maritime boundaries in Eastern Mediterranean could be defined as a particular *volcano region* which is ready to erupt. On the other words, avalanche-growing consequences may result. There are many maritime delimitation disputes which cause conflict between littoral or opposite states. Due to, “Eastern Mediterranean is a distinctly maritime region known as a semi-enclosed sea” (Gözügüzelli,2017, thegreatmiddleeast.com). Indeed, the “Mediterranean is an example of a semi-enclosed sea, according to the definition given in Article 122 of the Law of Sea Convention” (Meier, 2013, p.3, Ronzitti, 2010, p.6). The regime of semi-enclosed seas is spelled out in Article 123, which encourages the bordering states to cooperate directly or through appropriate regional organizations in several areas, such as the conservation and exploitation of sea resources, protection of the marine environment, and coordination of maritime research. Security is not mentioned. Other states, not bordering on the semi-enclosed sea, may invite to cooperate (Ronzitti, 2010, p.6). Whereas, Greek Cypriots have been continuing to disregard the Article 122-123 of the UNCLOS in the Mediterranean.

As it is known that in the last few years, potential offshore natural gas fields have been discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean. Energy Companies argue that there are huge oil and gas reserves in the little-explored Mediterranean Sea between Greece, Turkey, “Cyprus”, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon (Gözügüzelli, 2017, thegreatmiddleeast.com).

Driven by the possibility (proven or suspected) of vast untapped resources in the seabed, Eastern Mediterranean States began to make expansive claims to the seabed (Davenport, 2012). However, the semi-enclosed structure of Eastern Mediterranean has meant that all regional countries are semi-enclosed either as territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, or continental shelf. This has resulted in a multitude of overlapping claims, some of which have caused tensions in bilateral relations and undermined peace and stability in the region such as the case of Turkey vs “Cyprus” dispute. Notwithstanding this, Eastern Mediterranean may be described as the “Volcano Zone”. Indeed, instability and conflict in Eastern Mediterranean could become drivers of insecurity for the energy security. Because there is no any consensus for EEZ between opposite or adjacent states in the region. Overlapping borders are caused the increasing tensions.

The beginning of the problem started by the Greek Cypriot administration (as a securitizing actor) which drew so-called EEZ line with Egypt in 2003. In 2007, another “EEZ” agreement signed but still pending by Lebanon Parliament. Additionally, in February 2007, the Greek Cypriot administration announces the first licensing round in 11 exploration blocks. Block 3 and 13 were excluded. In 2010 they signed another so-called EEZ Agreement with Israel. In result, GCs accept many domestic law regulations for expanding their claimed EEZ area over whole Cyprus that creates the overlapping borders with Turkey and TRNC which violates their Continental Shelf area or their maritime jurisdiction zones.

Until that time, the Greek Cypriot administration tried to show the main problem with Turkey is related the gas issue which periodically raised tensions, with Turkey demanding the Greek Cypriot postpone drilling until the solution of the Cyprus problem. Whereas it was one of the parts of the maritime delimitation question with Greek Cypriot, not drilling activities. Greek Cypriots used energy as a political weapon for expanding the

maritime zones in the region. In fact, Greek Cypriot's policy on securitization of maritime zones is the main target in order to accept new law provisions for strength their claimed sovereign areas which violate TCs and Turkey's inherent rights. This policy has been used also for the reason of militarization in the claimed "Cyprus EEZ areas". Additionally, on delimitation, both sides also have different legal arguments and Cyprus problem also the main component of the dispute.

Indeed maritime delimitation dispute is perceived as a vital issue for coastal states. The Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) addresses the various areas and came into force in 1994, and to date, 167 countries and the European Commission has joined the treaty, but over 400 maritime delimitation disputes happened as security concerns. In this respect, security is an important issue for understanding the dispute between Turkey and Greek Cypriot administration. Additionally, "after existing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states' rights over maritime zones were expanded, and there was a large increase in the number of maritime border disputes. Many of these disputes, including several with hydrocarbon resources in the disputed area, were referred by the disputing states to an international dispute resolution body for a ruling, despite the costs associated with such delegation" (VanLoozen, 2012, p.3). "States have been reluctant to delegate areas of state sovereignty which one of them is delimitate the maritime borders including continental shelf and exclusive economic to an international dispute resolution body" (VanLoozen, 2012, p.3). Lebanon and "Cyprus" (Greek Cypriot administration or "ROC") ratified the UNCLOS. However, "Israel, Turkey, and Syria have not ratified the convention, and the United States (which is involved in the region since Noble Energy, an American company, has discovered and is developing most of the gas in the region) has not ratified it either" (Ben-Ari, 2012, p.15-16).

Especially, according to the International Crisis Group Report, Eastern Mediterranean tensions have risen since late 2011, when Greek Cypriots unilaterally began drilling in their rich offshore hydrocarbon reserves and Turkey responded with tough criticism and threatening naval maneuvers. Contested maritime boundaries and exploration of natural gas deposits off the divided island are the sources of the current dispute, but tensions also result from the slow down of UN-mediated Cyprus reunification talks (International Crisis Group, 2012). The Greek Cypriot administration' approach is more political than legal, whereas Turkey warns GCs to obey the international law. It is obvious that Greek Cypriots don't use the UNCLOS explicitly to delimitate their borders. The maritime borders between Egypt and "Cyprus" is effected by the median line" that mentioned in the agreement. This resulted in the violation of the West region of Turkey's continental shelf zone including southwest. Hence, one can deduce that when Israel and Cyprus drew the delimitation maritime border, they did not rely on UNCLOS, previous judgments by ICJ or related arbitrary courts on maritime delimitation or customary law. Due to 2010 EEZ agreement, violates Lebanon's maritime borders, caused Lebanon-Israel maritime delimitation dispute.

GCs objections against Turkey is not valid and based on value principles of the international law. The article of 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stresses that "a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent". In this case, since there are many states in the Mediterranean disputing their maritime boundaries, and in the case where two states agree on any EEZ agreement

which affects the other state maritime zone, it will not have legitimacy. Problems over overlapping maritime borders in the region and recent maritime delimitation attempts increase the tension between states. Turkey and “Cyprus” or Lebanon and Israel are in the same situation. Lebanon doesn’t recognize Israel as officially that is same for Turkey & “Cyprus”. There are other actors which have not recognized yet: TRNC and Palestine, even though, Syrian crisis continues. These issues are taking dangerous path deflagrate relations between regional countries. Cyprus, for instance, pursued the crises in exploring, drilling activities with international energy companies.

Indeed, Greek Cypriots claimed that they have the “sovereign right” to explore for natural resources in the so-called “Republic’s EEZ”. Although, the Greek Cypriot administration accepts that natural resources will be a federal competence in the event of a settlement of the Cyprus problem and, by implication, a shared resource for whole “Cypriots”. But to date, they have not been willing to discuss current hydrocarbons’ exploration in any context of settlement negotiations over the dispute.

Concerning the EEZ exploration rights, the international communities support the Greek Cypriot position, although most international actors generally make it clear that the revenues should be shared with the Turkish Cypriots in the event of a solution. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, argue that any offshore exploration or exploitation carried out or authorized by the Greek Cypriots is the unilateral act of one community (Gürel and Mullen, 2014). The reality is that Greek Cypriot administration violates the maritime areas of Turkey and TRNC. Turkish Cypriots and Turkish rights are ignored by the Greek Cypriot administration, still, they are acting as they are unique representatives of the island which not reflects the realities. As a summary, today, it is observed that energy security has gained importance after the hydrocarbons sector began drilling in the region. Even there is no only Turkey vs “Cyprus” dispute, although, the maritime border disputes in the region continues between Israel and Palestine, Israel and Lebanon, TRNC and the Greek Cypriot administration.

The study is composed of five parts, each of them dealing with aspects of the energy security threats in the Mediterranean with maritime delimitation disputes in the context of Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Administration. Part One relevant the multiple characters of the Mediterranean. Part Two illustrates the proposed energy roads in Mediterranean and axis of energy insecurity. Part Three looks at Greek Cypriots drilling activities and reflection of Turkey. Part Four concentrates on problems resulting from ENI’s drilling efforts in 3. Block with latest developments. Conclusions are drawn in Part Five.

## **2. Multiple Characteristics of The Mediterranean**

In fact, the sources of insecurity in the eastern Mediterranean are diverse. They include a series of unresolved regional and inter-state conflicts, and a number of prominent functional security problems of a “hard” and “soft” nature – terrorism and political violence, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized and disorganized crime, uncontrolled migration, environmental and health risks, energy security, and more diffuse, perceived risks to identity (Lesser,2005,p.6-7). The depth of its water and the

nature of its bottom relief allow submarines the best employment. This has played and is still playing an important and vital role in the military relations between the countries whose interests are associated with the Mediterranean (Talha, 1990, p.11).

The question of security is not constrained only to one part of the region. It ought to be viewed through three distinct dimensions; the first concerns the national security of each individual country. The second is the regional security of separate entities. Lastly, since World War II, the international dimension has imposed itself through the presence and influence of the superpowers. The Mediterranean region is one of the most unstable areas in the world.

Since the end of World War II, one-third of the internal and international conflicts had happened in the Mediterranean area. The period 1973-1975 is considered the apex point of the Arab-Israeli War 1973, the Cyprus Crisis, Civil War in Lebanon and many other conflicts and sources of instability (Kağan, 2012). The area has witnessed lately the emergence of new sources of instability, such as terrorism, religious fundamentalism and so on.

Beside the above sources of instability, there are the Cyprus question and Palestine which are considered the main source of crises and tensions, not only in the area but also internationally. Even today the Syrian crises affect the regional security. Achieving peace and security requires a mutual dynamic interaction between the region and the international framework. More than one single power controls the Mediterranean, and these powers do not belong to the region. The Mediterranean basin is a heterogeneous region since the sea connects highly industrialized countries in the north with developing countries in the south. The littoral countries of the Mediterranean can be grouped according to their geographical location: European countries, North African countries, and Middle Eastern countries and Mediterranean countries. All these countries are linked by different ties which originate from historic, cultural, political and economic factors. Their political regimes vary from parliamentarian to presidential republics to constitutional monarchies. While among the there are some political problems and tensions (Turkey, TRNC, and Greece, Greek Cypriot administration), in general terms these countries present a “heterogeneous” picture.

Not only are there large differences in the size of the population, in the level of health and in the states of economic developments, but also in the perception of national security. On the southern and eastern coasts, the picture is more complicated due to demographic differences. While some nations with significant economic resources have a very limited population, others have high and increasing population diversity, but limited resources. In addition, there are social and cultural differences and political and ideological contradictions. In this area religion is an important element of differences. There are three monotheistic faiths (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity). Religion has been a major supporting factor for the various current political struggles (Talha, 1990).

In sum, the Mediterranean region is still providing to be complex issues. Current maritime borders make it harder for the parties to reach compromise over energy security. Even if the proposed pipeline projects, without delimitation of the maritime border in respect to other states rights, the conflict will be the inevitable fragile structure of the energy security.

### 3. Energy Security

Furthermore, definitions of ‘energy security’ range from narrow issues of physical supply disruption to broader ones involving the economic, environmental, and political consequences of changes to energy markets. The simplest definition, used by the International Energy Agency (IEA), refers to energy security as ‘the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price’. Achieving this security requires efforts to reduce risks to energy systems, both internal and external, and to build resilience in order to manage the risks that remain. Tools to achieve this include: ensuring markets function so that the forces of demand and supply correspond; developing adequate production and transport infrastructure; expanding risk management systems (reserves, emergency planning and alternative supply routes); maintaining a diversified portfolio of energy suppliers; and keeping demand under control (energy efficiency). But energy security considerations must also be balanced against competitiveness and environmental concerns – notably those related to climate change (Dreyer and Stang, 2013). The growing popularity of linking energy security and climate change is rooted more in tactical political goals than in a real understanding of exactly how and where these two issues are linked (Global Agenda Council on Energy Security, 2015). On the other side, Weissenbacher defined energy as the ability or capacity to do work. The command of energy thus plays a fundamental role for societies, setting the outer limits of what can be accomplished by communities, nations or any social entity (Weissenbacher, 2009).

Since its inception the security studies represent the core of the international relations, predominantly dealing with the issues of war and peace. In the years following the second world war security studies have become a synonym for strategic studies with a distinct focus on the military sector. However with the growing complexity of the international relations agenda, namely the rise of economic and environmental challenges count, emergence of the new security challenges, risks and threats, emergence of the new international actors, the traditional view of the sole concept of security, that is, its essence, has become too narrow (Sulovic, 2010). In this respect, the energy security started to be considered as part of a consistent and more comprehensive policy. At least, Shaffer described energy security has three components: reliability, affordability, and environmental sustainability (Shaffer, 2009). Even though, energy policy remains a highly controversial issue throughout the world. Especially on the high prices of energy and geopolitical concerns over the security supply still on the agenda. Political instabilities also make insecurity of energy.

Beside, Turkey is known as energy corridor between East and West. Turkey would be very secure, low cost and efficient between Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. This would be benefit the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, or for regional states to get huge opportunity. Whereas Greek Cypriots have been pursuing an provocative policy in the Eastern Mediterranean that conducting oil/gas exploration and issuing permits for such drilling activities around the island. Energy should be a new horizons for peace and harmony, but that is too far, more complex with Greek Cypriots unilateral activities which disregard Turkish Cypriot’s existing rights but also challenge Turkey’s maritime jurisdiction zones.

#### 4. Proposed Energy Roads And Axis Of Energy Insecurity

Despite all security concerns in the region, energy security has gained importance after the hydrocarbons sector began drilling in the region. The fundamental importance of energy security has meant that national security relating to broad power in the economy are “*the most vital*” issues, as they lie “*at the very heart of sovereignty*”. Hence, the significance of national interests over maritime zone provides the ‘crystallization of disagreement between the disputes States’ (Klein, 2010, p.258). “The IEA defines energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price. Energy security has many aspects: long-term energy security mainly deals with timely investments to supply energy in line with economic developments and environmental needs. On the other hand, short-term energy security focuses on the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes in the supply-demand balance( Energy Security, IEA, <https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/>).

“Threats to energy security include the political instability of several energy producing countries, the manipulation of energy supplies, the competition over energy sources, attacks on supply infrastructure, as well as accidents, natural disasters, terrorism, and reliance on foreign countries for oil” (Power plays: Energy and Australia’s security”. Aspi.org.au. Retrieved 2015-11-14. Energy Security, Wikipedia, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy\\_security#cite\\_note-5](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_security#cite_note-5)).

Energy discoveries in Eastern Mediterranean triggered the cooperation and conflict between states, but energy security still is unclear in the region. As explained below that active, inactive and proposed pipeline projects of the region:

Pipelines	Capacity bbl/d	MMcf/d	Notes
<b>ACTIVE</b>			
Egypt-Jordan-Syria-Lebanon (Arab gas pipeline)	---	966	Egypt-Jordan flows intermittent and at volumes less than contracted flows to Syria and Lebanon offline
Iraq-Syria (Aln Zalah-Sufayah-Suwediya)	---	----	Small pipeline in the northeast of Syria; not a significant for international pipeline
<b>INACTIVE</b>			
Egypt-Israel (El-Arish-Askhelon)	----	677	-No flows since 2011

Iraq-Syria	1,400,000	---	Iraq section
(SCOTLINE),two pipelines			inoperable
			Status of Syrian section uncertain
Saudi Arabia-Jordan	315,000-	---	Section from Saudi Arabia to Jordan closed since 1990; discussion for
(Tans Arabian Pipeline(Tapline)	500,000		
			re opening occur
			occasionally
Syria-Leabonon(Gasyle1)	----	300	Not currently in operation;
			temporarily supplied Arab Gas Pipeline
			voles to Lebanon
PROPOSED			
Pipelines	Capacity bbl/d	MMcf/d	Notes
Azarbaijan-Turkey-Syria	---	100-300	Infrastructure build-out not completed; Project unlikely to move forward
"Cyprus"-Greece	---	unknown	Proposed export pipeline from Cyprus; could connect to European distribution
Egypt-Palestinian Territories	----	unknown	Intented to supply natural gas to PT generating facilities; no

			details available
Iran,Iraq,Syrian Gas Pipeline	---	110	News reports
(Islamic Gas Pipeline)			Indicate
			Construction
			completed by
			2013; 20-25
			M M e m / d
			to Iraq
			Power
Iraq-Jordan	98,000	---	Proposed as
(Zarqa spur line of Haditha-			alternative
Aqaba pipeline)			to
			trucks on
			this
			route; no
			Significant
			Progress
Iraq-Syria (Haditha Baniyas,	2,750,000	Unknown	Two oil
Two oil pipelines, on natural			pipeline,
Gas pipeline			one from
			northern Iraq
			an
			done from
			southern
			Iraq; one
			natural gas
			pipeline to
			aid
			Operation
Israel -Turkey	----	unknown	Peliminary
			discussions
			on
			Israel -Tur-
			key
			natural gas
			pipeline as
			alternative
			to
			E - N - G
			exports; no
			Project pro-
			posal
			as of July
			2013
Syria-Lebanon(Homs-Tripoli)	---	378	Project
			abandoned
Syria-Turkey(Aleppo-Kilis)	---	145	Arab Gas
			Pipeline
			extension
			;Projectsta-
			iled
Turkey-Israel (Ceyhan-Haifa)	800,000	----	265 mile
			pipeline
			would con-
			nect
			Israel to
			Turkish

Energy hub in Ceyhan; no significant progress yet

**Figure 1:** Active, Inactive, and proposed pipelines in Eastern Mediterranean

**Source;** EIA, IHS EDIN, IHS Global Insight, PFC Energy, Pipelines International company reports, 2013.

In accordance to these pipelines projects, it is understood that the Eastern Mediterranean's location between the major oil producers of the Middle East and major demand markets in Europe is strategically significant. Additionally, the nearby Suez Canal is a major checkpoint in international shipping, particularly for oil and oil products. Further, the large offshore discoveries of natural gas make the outlook for the region as an energy hub more promising (U.S. Energy Information Administration Report on Eastern Mediterranean Countries, 2013).

Greek Cypriots intent is to become an important energy hub in Eastern Mediterranean region. The LNG terminal is targeted for export the products. Greek Cypriots hope to begin exporting natural gas from the Aphrodite field by 2019. The construction of a LNG terminal at Vasilikos is planing. Whereas, "there are proposals, at varying stages of development, to export gas via pipeline and as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from both Cyprus and Israel" (for a more detailed discussion of the proposed export routes" (see EIA's regional brief Oil and Natural Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean).

The planing routes are;

- "A new pipeline from the eastern Mediterranean to Crete (where the volumes could flow into the European grid)
- A new pipeline from the eastern Mediterranean to Turkey
- Use of existing infrastructure to send volumes to Egypt for export via its LNG facilities (Eastern Mediterranean natural gas exploration focused on the Levant Basin, US Energy Information Administration, 20 August 2013, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12611> ).

The East-Med pipeline Project has developed for carrying the gas into Europe from Cyprus to Greece via Crete (Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Pipeline – Pre-FEED Studies, European Commission, <https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/projects-by-country/multi-country/7.3.1-0025-elcy-s-m-15>).

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by South Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Italy on 5 December 2017. The intention of this memorandum is to cooperate in enabling and enhancing the development and the implementation of the EastMed pipeline project as a viable and strategic option and an infrastructure of special interest for gas producing states and the EU" (Lakkotrypīs Signs MoU in Relation to the Eastmed Pipeline Project, 6 December 2017, Gold News, <http://www.goldnews.com.cy/en/energy/lakkotrypīs-signs-mou-in-relation-to-the-eastmed-pipeline-project>).

The main target is providing energy security for Europe. For that reason, East-Med project, "financially and politically supported by the European Commission, proposes to transport 8-16 billion cubic metres annually of natural gas through a pipeline – more

than 2,000 kilometres long and with depths in some locations exceeding 2,000 metres – across the eastern Mediterranean. With a cost exceeding €6 billion, the pipeline would transport in the first stage Israeli and Cypriot gas to Greece and offers the European Union a good alternative to Russian gas” (Abboud Zahr, Challenges of an East Med pipeline, 2 July 2017, Cyprus Mail, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2017/07/02/challenges-east-med-pipeline/>).

As the result, the Eastern Mediterranean (EastMed) pipeline project aims to: i) enhance Europe’s gas security of supply via diversification of counterparts, routes and sources; ii) develop EU indigenous resources such as the offshore gas reserves around Cyprus and Greece; and iii) promote the development of a South Mediterranean Gas Hub (A direct link to new sources for Europe, IGI Poseidon, <http://www.igi-poseidon.com/en/eastmed>). This makes EU ignore the rights of the other actors and delimitation problems in the Mediterranean. In this case, the Greek Cypriots illegal activities based on *hypocritical politics of Europeans*.

Additionally, the region has gained more importance with **Modern Silk Road** or the **Belt and Road Project** which is “aimed at connecting China by land and sea to South-east Asia, Pakistan and Central Asia, and beyond to the Middle East, Europe and Africa” (China’s new ‘Silk Road’ cannot be one-way, France’s Macron says, Cyprus Mail, 8 Jan 2018, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/08/chinas-new-silk-road-cannot-one-way-frances-macron-says/>). Turkey is the dominant power in the region for transferring energy into Europe. The Belt and Road Project strengthens Turkey’s strategic importance. Haifa Project is still frozen but will be the best way for carrying the gas. It seems that Turkey will be energy hub in the Mediterranean in next future with its pipeline projects or energy activities.

On the contrary, several factors may influence how and when exports may come on-line: regional insecurity, such as the ongoing conflict in Syria and the recent unrest in Egypt; territorial disputes, such as that between Israel and Lebanon; and the status of economies in both potential exporting countries and destination markets like Europe and Asia (Eastern Mediterranean natural gas exploration focused on the Levant Basin, US Energy Information Administration, 20 August 2013, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12611> ).

Despite the all several factors, Turkey provides the regional security and peace. Turkey is the dominant actor in the region, struggling the terrorism, providing the energy security which export of gas to Europe, including the southern, playing as a vital role both the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Turkey expanded its relations with Russia and Iran as well as the oil-rich region in Iraq. Turkey now in the Mediterranean and showed its determinants which protect its maritime jurisdiction zones. Turkey would be able to import larger quantities of gas from Israel, Lebanon, Gaza and possibly TRNC as well as Syria. Turkey industry is rapidly growing in the energy sector which ensuring its own long-term energy supplies. Turkey is the centre of the transit revenues from the Mediterranean to Europe.

## 5. Greek Cypriots Drilling Activities And Reflections of Turkey

An agreement between the Greek Cypriot administration and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the delimitation of EEZ was signed on 17 February 2003. It covers 5 articles and 2 annexes. This was published in Law of Sea Bulletin, No.52. This agreement was the first signs of the maritime delimitation dispute of the Turkey and “ROC”. One year later information note by Turkey concerning its objections to the Agreement between so-called “ROC” and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 February 2003 was published in Law of Sea Bulletin, No 54, in 2004. Following a examination of the said agreement, the Republic of Turkey has reached the view that the delimitation of the EEZ or the continental shelf in Eastern Mediterranean, especially in areas falling beyond the western part of the longitude 32°16’18”, also concerns Turkey existing ipso facto and ab initio legal and sovereign rights, emanating from the established principles of international law and principles of equity importance was stressed in the note. Additionally, Turkey notices that there is no single authority which in law or in fact is competent to represent jointly the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, consequently Cyprus as a whole (Law of Sea Bulletin, No.54, p.127).

A year later, the Greek Cypriot administration reaction to Turkey’s response was placed in Law of Sea Bulletin, No 57 in 2005. In this text, the Greek Cypriot administration claimed that Republic of Turkey’s allegations is “vague and unfounded”, both in law and in substance. Turkish arguments were defined as “null and void” (See more details to Law of Sea Bulletin, No.57, 2005, p.125). After these reactions of the Greek Cypriot administration, Turkey published a note verbale dated on 4 October 2005, from the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It was published in the Law of Sea Bulletin, No.57 in 2005. Turkey refutes the Greek Cypriot claims and stressed the delimitation of maritime areas creates obligations for all States, additionally, mentioned in the bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, such as Mediterranean sea is under the obligation to cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties. And again points out there is no single authority in Cyprus (Law of Sea Bulletin, No.57, 2005).

Note verbale dated on 19 October 2006 from the Permanent Mission so-called “Republic of Cyprus” to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the communication dated 4 October 2005 from Turkey (Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 62). Turkey accused of continues to “illegally occupy” a part of the maritime zones of the “ROC” and prevents the latter from exercising effective control over a part of its “sovereign territory” (See more details in Law of Sea Bulletin, No.62, p.164).

In fact, Turkey’s objections to related so-called EEZ agreement with Egypt prove the invalid structure of this treaty in international law. Greek Cypriots continue to act as a single authority of the island. As finally, they announced their first licencing round offshore for the award of hydrocarbon exploration licences.

The Greek Cypriot Administration subsequent hydrocarbon exploitation licenses in eleven (11) Exploration Blocks within the claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) of “Cyprus”, which licensing round had been announced on 15 February 2007. A rele-

vant Notice was published in the Official Journal of the European Union to the above effect by the Government of Cyprus (Antoniou and Demetriadi, 2015). The 1st Licensing Round had been based on the MC2D-CYP2006 seismic data that were acquired in 2006. Following extensive negotiations, the Government of Greek Cypriots awarded an exploration license for the area in the EEZ identified as block 12 (“Block 12”) was granted to Noble Energy International Ltd (“Noble”) on 24 October 2008. In October 2013, Noble carried out appraisal drillings in Block 12. The results have confirmed natural gas reserves of 3.6 to 6 trillion cubic feet (tcf), with a gross mean of 5 tcf (14 November 2012, Cyprus Gas News).

In 2010, Lebanon submitted to the UN a chart of geographical coordinates defining the western, northern and southern limits of its Exclusive Economic Zone. The chart unilaterally delimits the Lebanon-Israel maritime border and extends Lebanon- “Cyprus” maritime boundary southwards, such that it differs from the 2007 Lebanon- “Cyprus” bilateral agreement which was not ratified by Lebanon (Ben-Ari, 2012, p.21).

In fact, Lebanese Parliament did not ratify this agreement, however, but another delimitation of its own EEZ was adopted by the Council of Ministers (Decision No 51) on 21 May 2009. Contrary to the 2007 agreement, the 2009 delineation that will be confirmed with a list of geographical coordinates sent to the UN Secretary-General in July and October 2010, adding the six points of 2007 north and South limits of the EEZ, providing new coordinates for triple-point border in the North (with Cyprus and Syria) and in South (with Cyprus and Lebanon). These two numbers added point 7 (North) and 23 (South) are respectively the northwest and southwest limits of the Lebanese EEZ (Meier, 2013, p.3).

Turkey’s made these efforts stance should TRNC and both TC’s legitimate and legal rights in the eastern Mediterranean and the interests of the present, he shall be committed to the protection of the rights and interests, it has announced that it will not be allowed to attempt for them to wear. Thus, the GCA of agreements with countries where laws or related interests in this regard was emphasized that no provision in terms of Turkey (No.18,30 January 2007 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

In October 2008, Texas-based Noble Energy is granted an exploration licence for Block 12 for an initial period of three years. After one month later, in November 2008, Turkish naval vessels did not give any permission to any Greek Cypriot or foreign vessels conducting seismic exploration for hydrocarbon deposits in waters of the South of the island, because of Turkey’s continental shelf region is violated. 12 block is the main dispute era which Turkey is not recognizing the proclaimed blocs. Because all these are the part of the Cyprus issue. Whereas, the Greek Cypriot administration prefers a way to expand the problem through the sea. The main delimitation dispute with Turkey is directly related to the proclaimed 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 blocks which violate Turkish continental shelf era and the rest of the blocs are related to the protection of the Turkish Cypriots rights. About 12 blocks, Turkey mentioned that that was a provocative action. On the other hand, Turkey stressed that there are two different but equal nation in the island. One side cannot ignore the other. Because there is no single authority on the island.

Two years later, Cyprus and Israel made an agreement on the delimitation of EEZ. In December 2010 Noble Energy announces the discovery of the Leviathan gas field in

Israeli waters. The Leviathan gas field was the largest gas field in the Mediterranean Sea until the August 2015 discovery of the Zohr gas field off the coast of Egypt, only 6 km from Cyprus's Block 11 ("Italy's Eni finds 'supergiant' natural gas field off Egypt". Associated Press. 30 August 2015. Retrieved 25 October 2015.) It is the largest gas reservoir (between 18 trillion cubic feet to 22 trillion cubic feet) in the Mediterranean Sea until the August 2015 discovery of the Zohr gas field off the coast of Egypt.

After the discovery of the Leviathan gas fields in 2010, Lebanon argued that the field extends into Lebanese waters. Lebanon's Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated that Israel is "ignoring the fact that according to the maps the deposit extends into Lebanese waters," Agence France-Presse reported on June 9 (Jonathan Ferziger and David Wainer (June 24, 2010). "Landau Says Israel Could Use Force to Shield Gas Find". Businessweek. Retrieved 2 January 2011.). Israeli Minister of National Infrastructures Uzi Landau responded "We will not hesitate to use our force and strength to protect not only the rule of law but the international maritime law," in an interview (Jonathan Ferziger and David Wainer (June 24, 2010). "Landau Says Israel Could Use Force to Shield Gas Find". Businessweek. Retrieved 2 January 2011.)

In August 2010, Lebanon submitted to the United Nations its official view regarding the maritime border, indicating that it considered the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields to be outside Lebanese territory (though it indicated other prospective fields in the region may be within Lebanese territory). The US expressed support for the Lebanon proposal (Barak Ravid (2011-07-10). "U.S. Lebanon on the maritime border dispute with Israel". Haaretz. Retrieved 2012-01-30.) .

Until that time Greek Cypriot administration tried to show the main problem with Turkey is related the gas issue which periodically raised tensions, with Turkey demanding the Greek Cypriot postpone drilling until the solution of the Cyprus problem. Whereas, it was one of the parts of the maritime delimitation question with Greek Cypriot, not only drilling activities. Moreover, energy security is related to the state interests and energy companies' interests in the energy field that how they provide a safety. Therefore, Greek Cypriots used energy as a political weapon for expanding the maritime zones and tries to be an energy hub in the region.

The Greek Cypriot administration tries to carrying out-licensing activities and win a chance to infringe the Turkish maritime zones (32 18 16 E). In fact, Turkey determines to protect its maritime zones and Turkish Cypriots rights. Additionally, the Greek Cypriot administration ignores the realities of Cyprus dispute. As should be accepted that there are two different sovereign entity on the island and no one cannot represent each other. For that reason, Greek Cypriots cannot violate Turkish Cypriots inherent rights. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot administration stresses that natural resources will be a federal competence in the event of a settlement of the Cyprus problem and, by implication, a shared resource. But to date, they have not been willing to discuss current hydrocarbons exploration within the context of settlement negotiations. Concerning the EEZ exploration rights, the international community support the Greek Cypriot position, although most international actors generally make it clear that the revenues should be shared with the Turkish Cypriots in the event of a solution. On contrary, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey argue that any offshore exploration or exploitation carried out or

authorized by the Greek Cypriots is the unilateral act of one community (Gurel and Mullen, 2014). The reality is that Greek Cypriot administration violates the maritime areas of Turkey and TRNC. Turkish Cypriots and Turkish rights are ignored by the Greek Cypriot administration, still, they are acting as a “unique representative of the island”.

Indeed, in mid-September (19), 2011, Noble Energy commences exploratory drilling in Block 12 started. After this developments, In fact, Turkey made a strategy for protection Turkish Cypriots rights. Firstly, Turkey and TRNC signed a Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement on 21 September 2011.

According to this agreement, the coordinates determined and partial delimitation has drawn. The meaning of this, there are other boundaries which will be drawn. Taking this provision, it should be stressed that this agreement is important in terms of ensuring the rights of both nations over the island. Also, this delimitation agreement considered the Greek Cypriot administration rights.

When Greek Cypriots explained the 12 Block is given to Noble Energy (then Delek Drilling participated), the permits to the Turkish National Oil and Gas Company (TPAO) is given a right for seismic research by TRNC’s Economy and Energy Ministry over declared A, B, C, D, E, F, G (the related map will be shown in figure 32). This was based on Oilfield Services and Production Sharing Agreement signed between the TRNC Ministry of Economy and Energy and Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) on 2 November 2011. Contract to provide TPAO with exploration, well exploration and authorization for operation based on profit share. Turkey’ Energy Minister explained that it is not yet clear what the Greek Cypriot Administration and the Nobel company will give to the Cypriot people. Turkey’s Energy Minister stressed that: “We will make a very clear and transparent agreement here between Turkey and TPAO and we will sign an agreement which is very appropriate with international law and treaty based on the revenue sharing and production sharing model between TRNC and Turkey. Hence, the Nobel Energy Company and the Greek Cypriot Administration are not yet discussing what the Cypriot Administration will give to the Cypriot people, which is a matter of debate. Of course, all the values of the Cypriot people, whether North or South, in this work, carried out, it is absolutely necessary to share this information with the public.

The Minister of Energy of the TRNC explained “In the event of the drilling activities in Southern Cyprus, Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus agreed on the agreement to delimitate the continental shelf, so that the common will was put forward and necessary steps were taken. In result, they can sign the ‘Oilfield Services and Production Sharing Agreement’ with regard to the authorization of TPAO for the allocation of lands and the petroleum and natural gas exploration in these areas. TRNC’s Council of Ministers will authorize the exploration, drilling, and operation of TPAO as a contracting operator on the basis of a profit share. A contract to be signed between the Ministry and TPAO by a decision of authority dated October 27th, 2011. (KKTC ve Tpa0 Arasında ‘petrol Sahası Hizmetleri Üretim Paylaşımı Sözleşmesi’ İmzalandı, Haberler, 2 November 2011).

After the Nobel Energy exploration efforts on 19 September 2011, a reaction comes from TRNC a day later on 22 September 2011 and TRNC grant an exploration license to the TPAO to explore and exploit for oil and natural gas around the defined blocs. On

September 28, 2011, the Turkish seismographic vessel named Piri Reis and two Turkish warships come to the region. Piri Reis vessel searched in G area.

After two months, Nobel Energy announces the discovery of the Aphrodite gas field in Block 12.

The 2nd Offshore Licensing Round was a tendering process that took place and concluded within 2012, initiated through a notice from the Government of the Greek Cypriot administration was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 11 February 2012, inviting offers for the awarding of exploration and exploitation licenses within the “Cypriot”. The 2nd Offshore Licensing Round resulting in awarding more hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation licenses to bidding parties.

Then, Greek Cypriots opened an international bid and called energy companies for a survey of the 12 blocks of disputed offshore areas on 14 February 2012. This led to the energy war paradox in Eastern Mediterranean. In the end, American Noble Energy, Russian Gazprom, French and Italian energy giants Total and ENI, as well as the Korean Gas Company and Gazprom subsidiary Novatec were licensed to explore gas in the disputed blocks (Anastasios Giamouridis, 2013,p.7). This development triggered the tension in the Eastern Mediterranean. Because, the Greek Cypriot administration announced the second offshore licensing round for blocks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 in 2012, February.

On 24 January 2014, the Greek Cypriot administration continued to sign contracts granting licenses for exploration of blocks 2, 3, and 9 to the ENI-Kogas consortium.

A month later, they signed another contract for granting the license for the exploration of blocks 10 and 11 to French multinational Total Company on 6 February 2013. A week later Greek Cypriot authorities signed agreements for the transfer of 30 percent of Noble Energy’s exploration rights in Block 12 to Israeli companies named Delek Drilling and Avner Oil Exploration. In June 2013 Noble Energy began drilling work in Block 12. After four months later, Noble Energy announced results of the valuation drilling. The estimates for the Aphrodite field are gross mean reserves of 5 trillion cubic feet.

For reaction, it was announced that Turkey’s first three-dimensional seismic ship “Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha” completed his work in the Black Sea and passed to the Mediterranean. Barbaro’s vessel would make first the oil and gas exploration in Antalya then would go to the disputed area in the south of Cyprus (5 September 2013, Sabah newspaper). There are licenses belonging to TPAO for searching in the region which has the right to make a search in the south of Cyprus. The Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha vessel worked on behalf of TRNC and TPAO. As it is known, aftermaths of the Greek Cypriot administration and Israel EEZ Agreement in 2010, the Noble company reached the presence of natural gas in the 12th parcel. Following the unilateral stance of the Greek Cypriot side, TPAO announced that it had a license to make the seismic search in the south of the island under the agreement with the TRNC.

On December 2013, Noble Energy discloses that some 3 billion barrels of oil may lie in deepwater strata between Greek Cypriots and Israel offshore fields.

On September 25, 2014, ENI start drilling operations at the Onasagoras well in its Block 9 concession. This timeline is prepared by Elias Hazou in Cyprus Mail, dated 29 December 2016 which continues as below;

“On October 2014: Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades to pull out of peace talks with Turkish Cypriots for the reason of the Barbaros Hayreddin vessel seismic survey in Eastern Mediterranean (on 21 October 2014). Turkey issues a new marine advisory, sending the Barbaros, and again reserving areas for exploration in the eastern Mediterranean”( Elias Hazou in Cyprus Mail, dated 29 December 2016). Aftermaths, Fileleftheros informed that GC National Army had been in a high alarm since the day of Barbaros and its accompanying military vessels in the eastern Mediterranean, used the news of “National Guard Army in High Alarm Condition ... Army Red Alarm” (21 October 2014, Detay Kıbrıs).

One month later, in November 2014, the energy conference in Nicosia was regulated. In this conference, “Noble Energy announced that it is shelving plans for a land-based Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility. Regional pipelines are discussed as top priority subject. After that in December 2014, ENI announced it has not found commercially exploitable natural gas at the Onasagoras well”(Elias Hazou in Cyprus Mail, dated 29 December 2016).

“At the beginning of 2015 January, ENI began exploratory drilling at Amathusa well in Block 9. On March 2015, the Greek Cypriot government announces that ENI has not found commercially exploitable gas reserves at the Amathusa well. On April 2015, by assessing the UN, Turkey agrees not to renew its marine advisory, and to withdraw the Barbaros from TRNC. On June 7, 2015, the Block 12 partners, Noble Energy, Delek, and Avner, declare the Aphrodite gas field commercial and the partners submit to the government the Development and Production Plan for Aphrodite”( Elias Hazou in Cyprus Mail, dated 29 December 2016).

“In August 2015, ENI announces the discovery of the Zohr gas field in Egyptian waters. The largest to-date gas field in the Mediterranean Sea, Zohr holds an estimated 30 trillion cubic feet of lean gas in place. It lies six kilometres from Cyprus’ Block 11 and 90 kilometres from the Aphrodite gas find in Block 12. On December 28, 2015, the Greek Cypriot cabinet approved a request by the ENI-Kogas consortium to extend its exploration activities by two more years. Concessions were renewed for offshore blocks 2, 3 and 9. The consortium’s concession was due to expire in February 2016, now extended to February 2018. In December 2015, the Greek Cypriot cabinet approves the renewal of Total’s exploration concession on Block 11 for a period of two years, to February 2018. In January 2016, the GCs Energy Ministry announces that BG “Cyprus”, subsidiary of British multinational oil and gas company BG Group, has joined the Block 12 consortium with a 35 percent stake” ( Elias Hazou in Cyprus Mail, dated 29 December 2016).

“On February 2016, the Greek Cypriot administration announced the third offshore licensing round putting up for auction blocks 6, 8 and 10. The bids subsequently submitted are Block 6: ENI/Total Block 8: Capricorn Oil/Delek Drilling, ENI Block 10: ENI/Total, Exxon Mobil/Qatar Petroleum, and Statoil. Currently, blocks 2, 3, 9 and 12 are licensed. Total had held the concession on Block 10 but relinquished it last year after failing to identify targets. The block is located on the southern edge of Cyprus’ EEZ and

is in close proximity to Egypt's EEZ and the massive Zohr prospect" (Hazou, A Vote for a Confidence...24 March 2016, Cyprus Mail).

On December 21, 2016, the Greek Cypriot government announced the preferred bidders in the third licensing round. The preferred bidders are the consortium of Exxon-Mobil and Qatar Petroleum for Block 10; the consortium of ENI and Total for Block 6; and ENI for Block 8. According to Greek Cypriot energy minister, Giorgos Lakkotrypis, decisions to award concessions are expected in late January or February 2017.

From 2007 to 2017, the Cypriot administration continues energy activities that violate Turkey's maritime jurisdiction, while blocking the rights of the Turkish Cypriots which blocks are declared unilaterally. In fact the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone or continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution (article 74(1), article 83(1)). The delimitation with agreement doesn't envisage infringe the other' continental shelf or EEZ or give an official right to make drilling activities on overlapping borders. As it seen that Greek Cypriots violate the international law. Hence, the article of 78 is violated by Greek Cypriots. In accordance of article 78(2), the exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided for in this Convention.

As it is known that the last step by the Greek Cypriot administration happened over new license agreements with international agencies on April 5 and 6 2017, signed a third permit for investigations in blocks 6, 8 and 10 of the claimed Exclusive Economic Zone.

ENI and TOTAL for the 6th block, ENI for the 8th block and ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum for the 10th block were selected for the third permit. Turkey, on the other hand, stated that it would not allow it because it violates their maritime jurisdictions. Also, the 8th Region is within the scope of TRNC's authorization which conducted research by TPAO.

After this provocative step by the Greek Cypriot administration, Turkey has issued a naval report called Navtex. A wide range of seismic surveys, including the Cyprus deficit, was scheduled to begin in this framework between 21 April and 30 June 2017. The investigations will be carried out by the support of Bravo Supporter vessel who will be accompanied by Barbaros Hayreddin Seismic Search Ship.

The Greek Cypriot government explained that if the Turkish seismic search vessels come to the region and start research, they will be given the necessary answer based on international law. Turkey opposes the one-sided natural gas drilling that will be launched by the Greek Cypriot side in July due to the fact that the Turkish side also has the right to natural resources. Additionally, TRNC's oil exploration rights are given to Turkish Petroleum Corporation. The Barbaros Hayreddin Pasa seismic search vessel, which began its operations in the Mediterranean on April 21, will continue its activities in the Mediterranean until 31 May 2017. According to daily Kathimerini, the consortium of the TOTAL-ENI, in the so-called Southern Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone, the first drilling will be done on July 13, 2017, that runs parallel timetable attention (24 April

2017, AB Haber).

All these developments show that even if, both sides are dragged to the point where they will arrive at the threshold of hard power in 2018. But it is clear that tension and instability will continue in this process and afterwards.

## 6. The Latest Crisis In 2018

In the mid of the January, Turkey's Energy and Natural Resources Minister Berat Albayrak had said a ship would be sent "as soon as possible" (Turkish side's gas moves 'exacerbate tensions', 16 Jan 2018, Cyprus Mail, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/16/turkish-sides-gas-moves-exacerbate-tensions/>). This was the warning to the GCs drilling activities in the Mediterranean. Then Turkish Foreign Ministry Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu made an interview with Ekathimerini newspaper and explained that Block 6 of Cyprus's so-called exclusive economic zone (EEZ), where hydrocarbon exploration is already taking place, is within Turkey's continental shelf, while reiterating claims by the country that there is no sea border between Greece and South Cyprus. Çavuşoğlu stressed again that 2003 agreement between Egypt and Greek Cypriots are null and void which reiterated Turkey's objection to UN that this so-called EEZ agreement that the violates Turkey's continental shelf in areas falling beyond longitude 32' 16' 18" west. Greece is another part of the dispute. Greek Cypriots, Egypt and Greece are planning to make triple delimitation in Eastern Mediterranean without considering Turkey's continental shelf rights and TCs. In this concern, Çavuşoğlu mentioned that Turkey has also submitted to the UN our objection to the Greek hydrocarbon law (4001/2011), which contradicts the well-established rules and principles of international law by attempting to unilaterally define "the outer limits of the Greek continental shelf boundaries through a median line between continental land masses and insular formations, in particular such as the very small island of Kastellorizo (Meis)". As the result, Çavuşoğlu warned the sides that "Turkey fully exercises its sovereign rights over its continental shelf. No foreign country, company, or vessel may conduct any unauthorized hydrocarbon or scientific research activity on Turkey's continental shelf and the marine areas superjacent to it. This is a very clear fact" (Turkey maintains a tough stance on Cyprus in Kathimerini interview, 6 February 2018, Vasilis Nedos, Ekathimerini Newspaper, <http://www.ekathimerini.com/225524/opinion/ekathimerini/comment/turkey-maintains-tough-stance-on-cyprus-in-kathimerini-interview>).

The latest crisis exists with ENI's drilling plan in Block 3. ENI is the operator of Block 6 with 50 percent of participation interest while Total is a partner with the remaining half. ENI has been present in South Cyprus since 2013 and detains interests in six licenses located in the EEZ of Cyprus (in Blocks 2, 3, 6, 8, 9 and 11), five of which are operated ('Saipem 12000 will remain in position until situation is resolved' 11 February 2018, Cyprus mail, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/11/saipem-12000-will-remain-position-situation-resolved/>) "The Italian hydrocarbon company has also 100 percent of the rights for block 8. It is also part of a consortium with Total for block 11 and with South Korea's KoGas for blocks 2, 3 and 9 of the EEZ. Italy's energy giant Eni said that it made a lean gas discovery off the coast of Cyprus after drilling an exploratory well at Calypso, the target of exploration in block 6 of the island's exclusive economic zone

(EEZ)". (Stephania Orphanides, Eni made important gas discovery in block 6, minister says (Update-1)8 February 2018, Cyprus business mail, <http://cyprusbusinessmail.com/?p=59146>).

Eni was planning to drillship in the Cuttlefish field, in block 3, for a new exploratory drill. The target in block 3 is codenamed 'Soupia' (cuttlefish). But Turkey has issued a new NAVTEX (navigational warnings) in the region. Turkey has reserved for 'military training' a large swathe of sea area off Famagusta Bay extending to within 30km of the location of an upcoming gas drill in Cyprus' offshore block 3. Navtex 0153/18, issued by the Antalya Station, was effective on 12 February 2018 until 22 February.

The Greek Cypriot administration points out that "To us, these [Turkish] Navtex, these notices to mariners, do not exist. They have already been cancelled, and no one takes them into account or imparts any legitimacy to them." (Elias Hazou, Turkish Navtex will not affect drilling plans, govt says, 25 January 2018, Cyprus Mail, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/25/turkish-navtex-will-not-affect-drilling-plans-govt-says/>)

"The reserved area is some 3,740 square kilometres, starting from just 25km off Cape Greco and covering a large part of block 3. At its southernmost boundary, the reserved area is reportedly just 30 km from the target selected by ENI and Kogas for conducting an exploratory drill in early February. The entire area reserved by Turkey comes within the Nicosia Flight Information Region (FIR), which is almost interchangeable with Cyprus' Search and Rescue Area of Responsibility. In response, Cyprus issued a Navtex of its own, notifying mariners to disregard the Turkish navigational warning. Coming back, Turkish authorities issued a new Navtex (0155/18), claiming to nullify the Cypriot Navtex which sought to nullify the original Turkish notice to mariners. The Saipem 12000 drillship, leased by ENI, is currently located in block 6 – licensed to ENI and Total. Once finished in block 6, the drillship will immediately head out to block 3, at a drilling site dubbed 'Soupia' (Cuttlefish). Turkey maintains that "Cyprus" cannot unilaterally exploit its offshore natural gas resources without including the Turkish Cypriots" (Elias HAZOU, Turkey issues new Navtex warning, Cyprus Mail, 29 January 2018, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/01/29/turkey-issues-new-navtex-warning/>).

On the other side, the Turkish Cypriot 'foreign ministry' said "it would not accept the extension of ENI's activities into Block 3, which it claims for the 'TRNC' and accused the Greek Cypriots of raising tensions in the region. Turkey meanwhile is laying claim to sections of blocks 1, 4, 6, and 7 in Cyprus' EEZ saying the areas in question are part of its continental shelf" (Evie Andreou, Diplomatic steps taken to avoid escalation over drillship, Cyprus Mail, 11 February 2018, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/11/diplomatic-steps-taken-avoid-escalation-drillship/>).

The escalation still continues. In a two days of above mentioned crises, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan on 13 February 2018 warned South Cyprus not to "overstep the mark" in the eastern Mediterranean after Turkey sent warships to interdict a vessel exploring for natural gas over the weekend. Speaking to members of his ruling AK Party in parliament, Erdogan said Turkish warships and security units were monitoring developments in the region. "We warn those who overstep the mark in Cyprus and the Aegean," he said. Then, the European Union on Monday, 13 Feb. 2018, called on Turkey to avoid threats and "refrain from any actions that might damage good neighbourly" ties

after Cyprus accused the Turkish military of obstructing a drillship contracted by Italy's state-controlled ENI. Greek Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades said: "There is no cause for concern". (Elias Hazou, Cyprus should not 'overstep the mark' after ship incident, Erdogan says (Update 1), 13 February 2018, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/13/cyprus-not-overstep-mark-ship-incident-erdogan-says/>).

Aftermaths of these events, the Greek Cypriot administration continued to protest Turkey. Whereas UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres gave a speech about crises and stressed that all concerned parties should do their utmost to defuse tensions (Cyprus solution would resolve dispute says UNSG, diplomatic efforts ongoing (Update 1), 14 February 2018, Cyprus Mail, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/14/cyprus-solution-resolve-dispute-says-unsg/>) Greek Cypriots found this explanation not enough and urgently decided to meet with EU.

Besides, TRNC president Mr Akinci also made a press release over the crises. According to Akinci, the Greek Cypriot side was currently benefiting from the deterioration of Turkey's relations with some countries in the region, and in cooperation with Greece, was attempting to conclude EEZ alliances with countries such as Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. It was also trying to put Turkey into conflict with the 'big powers', which was evident, he said, from the companies they chose to carry out exploration such as France's Total, Italy's ENI and US companies such as ExxonMobil and Noble Energy. "By licensing these companies, in a sense, the Greek Cypriots are attempting to place Turkey in the confrontation with these states," said Akinci.. (Akinci suggests interim solution could end EEZ standoff – reports, 18 February, Cyprus Mail, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/18/akinci-suggests-interim-solution-eez-standoff-reports/>). In result, Turkey announced its new NAVTEX which military operations in the Mediterranean will continue until 10 March. This was led the protest again by the Greek Cypriots and urgently planned to take some measurements. On the other side, ENI announced that it will leave in the 3rd block, but protect its rights in Cyprus. Whereas GC administration is planning to continue their illegal drilling activities in the second half of the year .Hence, in the mid of the year "the consortium of US ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum is scheduled to carry out two drillings in block 10"( By Stelios Orphanides, Eni made the important gas discovery in block 6, minister says (Update-1)8 February 2018, Cyprus business mail, <http://cyprusbusinessmail.com/?p=59146> ). It seems that in the mid of the year, nothing will change. Greek Cypriots should aware that they can not ignore the Turkish Cypriots rights and cannot violate Turkey's continental shelf. Otherwise, they will be responsible for all results.

## 7. Conclusion

In fact, all related EEZ agreements of the Greek Cypriots with third parties seem the reproducing energy policy, whereas the real intention is the securitization of the maritime zones. The provocative steps by Greek Cypriots increase the instability of the energy security.

The main intentions of the Greek Cypriots are the driving force for presenting the issue as an existential security threat by securitizing acts. Of course, energy security can be conceptualized as a security sector. However, securing maritime laws affects its local,

regional and international arena. The main subject matter of dispute is related to the violations of the maritime national jurisdictions of Turkey which has been the vital issue. Undoubtedly, it can be claimed that Eastern Mediterranean-bordering countries are increasing energy activities in the region as changing environmental conditions provide access to new natural resource deposits. This makes Eastern Mediterranean countries as jockeying for power by re-mapping the sea floor and increasing their military presence, driving new security and diplomatic concerns that carry strategic significance for Turkey.

The regional and international peace can only be provided with taking into consideration of case awards of the arbitrary courts and international maritime law which aim to reach an equitable result. The bilateral negotiations are necessary. Moreover, the maritime boundary delimitation negotiations of parties should envisage the equity with taking into relative circumstances. Without taking into consideration Turkish Cypriots and Turkey's rights in the region, energy security will be at risk with political instabilities of the region.

In sum, "the Greek Cypriot Administration does not represent in law or in fact the Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus as a whole. As such, the Greek Cypriot Administration is not entitled to negotiate and conclude international agreements as well as adopt laws regarding the exploitation of natural resources on behalf of the entire island. Turkey's position is very clear: this issue should be a part of the comprehensive settlement in Cyprus" (MFA of Turkey, Greek Cypriot's Unilateral Activities in The Eastern Mediterranean, 2018).

On the other side, the securitization of the maritime rights which accepted as sovereign rights will increase the instability, because Greek Cypriot's unilateral action in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea will not bring a peace and security. No State cannot have the right to infringe others maritime zones. For this, the Greek Cypriot administration has to give up keeping the maritime delimitation dispute out of the meeting in the Cyprus negotiation process.

Contrary, apparently energy, but in reality maritime jurisdictions have been securitized in order to protect their national interests which have been concluded militarization in the name of the protection claimed EEZ by Greek Cypriots.

As result, today, the Greek Cypriot administration;

- Tries to create cut off effect or close the Mediterranean Sea against Turkey and TRNC
- Tries to violate Turkish Cypriots rights overseas including energy welfare and other rights
- Tries to have and control FIR air zone in regards to the whole "Cyprus"
- Tries to develop and increase the activities of arming and militarization within the framework of Search and Rescue Exercises against Turkey
- In short, spreading its claimed "sovereignty" over the sea wants to draw a new trilateral EEZ with Greece, Egypt and "ROC" and by this way, to have sea and air areas in the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Although, the desire to hold in the hands of many field authorities such as capturing all energy fields, extending fishing era, install the artificial islands in the whole island as a unique entity.

As conclusion, I should argue that the dispute creates a blind node in the region which could bring increasing tensions (hot maritime zones conflict) in further progress. The time has been come to think again an idiom that “good fences make good neighbours”. Although Turkey, due to its position, is suitable for being an energy transition centre (hub); however relevant factors and rights of Turkey’s and TCs still ignored by the international community. Hence Turkey determines to protect Turkish Cypriots rights not only regional at international level.

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